The purpose of this essay is to identify factors that constrain customers' ability to engage in sustainable energy consumption, conceived of as a consumption practice that reduces the moral hazards associated with fossil fuel over-consumption. We outline some marketing policy and consumer research issues related to the market system and we identify four constraints to sustainable energy consumption: policies/regulation, product accessibility/availability; pricing; and customer knowledge. This topic is important because of changes in the macro context of energy consumption, i.e., growing recognition that we live in a fundamentally resource constrained environment, and increased salience of various global commons effects to customers. Directions for future research are discussed.
Purpose
The first purpose of this essay is to identify factors that constrain customers' ability to engage in sustainable energy consumption, conceived of as a consumption practice that reduces the moral hazards associated with fossil fuel over-consumption (Farley and Daly 2006; IPCC 2007; Shultz II and Holbrook 1999) . The second purpose is to outline some marketing policy and consumer research issues related to the market system and the constraints we identify. This topic is important because of changes in the macro context of energy consumption, i.e., growing recognition that we live in a fundamentally resource constrained environment, and increased salience of various global commons effects to customers (Farley and Daly 2006; Shultz and Holbrook 1999) . Approaching this from a marketing systems perspective is useful because the challenges and opportunities associated with sustainable energy consumption accrue to various levels of and relationships within the market system (Layton 2007) . A systems perspective moves the argument about sustainable energy consumption away from intractable moral debates and toward potential solutions within market structures, incentives, and regulations.
Energy Consumption
Energy consumption has moved to center stage of disquiet about the global environment and economy because of twinned concerns about the effect of current systems of energy production, the galloping growth of energy consumption (IPCC 2007) , and the growing global competitive demand for energy resources. Macro policies like the Kyoto Protocols, regional policies like the EU cap-and-trade carbon trading system, national and regional policies such as state level renewable energy portfolio standards (DOE 2008) , and the introduction of various energy use and management options targeted at end customers by power companies are indicative of the market system-wide recognition of these twinned global concerns: environment and energy.
Normatively speaking, market systems are supposed to respond to consumer demand in order to produce a desirable standard of living. But a market system also generates externalities that challenge its existence and threaten desired standards of living. Frequently too there is a lag between what the system produces and evolving consumer demand. These externalities and this lag, which are almost certainly currently inducing a commons effect in the global ecosystem, (IPCC 2007; Shultz II and Holbrook 1999) may also produce consumption constraints (Layton 2007; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink and Bürer 2007) . In regard to energy consumption, a host of system-induced constraints may be identified depending upon disciplinary perspective, but we wish to focus on four aspects of the market system that constrain sustainable energy consumption: policies/regulation, product accessibility/availability; pricing; and customer knowledge. First, we will place this discussion in the context of sustainability.
Sustainability
Sustainability embodies a paradigm whereby individuals and other social actors seek to meet current needs, with an awareness of necessary actions to take to preserve the ability of future generations to meet their needs (UN General Assembly 1987) . The paradigm evaluates sustainability in business contexts as a "three-legged stool." In order to assure continuity, organizations must address the up-and downstream economic, social, and environmental 6 repercussions of their activities to reduce waste and increase their value added. Moreover, the health of each leg of this stool impacts future sustainability (Barbier 1987) . Because energy production and use are intricately tied to natural resources, environmental policy, and new product development, to understand constraints that affect the market system for energy consumption we must look at energy use from the systemic level. We assess a few aspects the systemic level here.
Corporate interest in sustainability has been influenced by several concerns. Corporations ranging from athletic shoe, furniture, and carpet manufacturers, to big box retailers are increasingly thinking about their carbon budgets, the cradle-to-cradle lifecycles of their products, and energy use in terms of natural resources used pollution costs, and consumer concerns with these issues (McDonough and Braungart 2002; Wal-mart 2007) . The economic benefits of sustainability thinking on corporate cost controls and reductions in environmental liabilities have driven significant corporate sustainability initiatives (Epstein 2008; Global Reporting Initiative; Green and Capell 2008) . Finally, nationwide surveys find that not only consumers, but also executives state that environmental issues (including climate change) are one of their biggest personal concerns for the next five years -a substantial increase even since 2006 (Bonini et al. 2008 ).
Perhaps surprisingly, consumers have begun to express their concerns for and interest in sustainable behavior in energy consumption. For example, evidence of an emerging sustainability segment may be found in a recent IBM report on utility customers. A global research project identified four major utility customer segments among both end users and small businesses, differentiated in terms of financial resources and proactive propensity. The most interesting group, representing a surprising 20 to 55 % of the total depending on the country 7 surveyed, are what IBM calls Energy Stalwarts. The individuals in this group have more disposable income to draw on than others, and are interested in proactively managing their energy consumption by participating in differential metering systems that allow them to schedule their highest use at times of off-peak demand in return for favorable pricing, for example. This group is also interested in managing its energy generation platform, supporting local power generation, and exploring the ability to sell back excess power into the secondary power grid (The latter option is however fraught with regulatory hurdles). This new segmentation clearly identifies a group concerned with sustainability and offers exciting new segmentation possibilities to the conservative and not typically very market-oriented electric utility industry (Valocchi, et al. 2007 ). Thus, we see that some consumers and firms are interested in thinking more about how their actions affect the wider world (i.e., the commons); as such, they are becoming more involved in how they use energy and the sources of their energy.
Historical Context for Marketing Interest in Energy Consumption
Marketing scholars' have taken an interest in energy before. In the early 1970s, several papers examined the connection between energy constraints and consumption (Fisk 1973; Levitt 1974; Ross 1980; Shapiro 1978) . These papers show a glimmer of the "three-legged stool" approach common in sustainability work (Barbier 1987) . Fisk (1973) proposed a theory of responsible consumption, which "refers to rational and efficient use of resources with respect to the global human population (24) ." This theory incorporated economic, social and environmental factors (the three-legged stool), and challenged marketing managers to employ these criteria in running their organizations and as a guide to future marketing policy . Shapiro 8 (1978) examined the role of marketing in a society with "increased ecological concern and natural resource constraints (3)." He pointed to serious issues with increased product generation with no regard to the environmental impact of production, and proposed that consumers attempt to "do more with less (7)" through resource sharing. He also proposed that producers institute "full-cost pricing (7)" that would incorporate hidden externalities (social cost and ecological services) into product prices. Shapiro suggested that changes should be made in managerial practice insofar as "practitioners find themselves in a world that values conservation, voluntary simplicity in lifestyles, and ecologically responsible corporate marketing (12)." However, the general point of view in the 1970s was that consumers and businesses had to ride through a business cycle, and that resource scarcity associated with the energy crisis would subside and life would continue as before (Hanna et al. 1975; Ross 1980) . Temporary resource reduction was thought a viable approach to resolving resource scarcity; an idea that current events discredit. Hence, suggestions for organizational coping included reducing the number of product offerings, downgrading products (i.e. no frills automobiles); creating higherefficiency products (i.e. air conditioners); and creating products where consumers participated in production (i.e., do-it-yourself; Shipchandler 1976; Levitt 1974) . In general, organizations were encouraged to gain control of their channels, and engage in vertical integration (Hanna et al. 1975 ). "Demarketing" was touted as another way to manage the energy crisis. Analogous to the contemporary idea of downshifting (Ghazi and Jones 1997), demarketing meant firms should encourage consumers to purchase less on a temporary or permanent basis (Hanna et al. 1975 ).
Other proposals for consumers to survive the energy crisis consistent with Jimmy Carter's infamous "malaise" speech of July 15, 1979, included careful planning and limiting purchase of 9 nonessential food items, doing without, and reducing consumption (Shipchandler 1976) . With the push for short-term solutions, ideas for paradigm shifts like Shapiro's faded.
It is striking to read through papers of the 1970s and recognize how today's business worldview is different. In the mid-1970s, the rising cost of energy and the environmental impact of human development were concerns relegated to the "marketing environment" netherworld in the dominant managerial frameworks. More recently the links between the global market economy and environmental degradation have become clearer (IPCC 2007) . Moreover, the seriousness of environmental degradation, the clear depletion of and constraints to natural resources, and the urgency for behavior change are now undeniable. Indeed, we now receive daily reminders (from the Weather channel!) that we live in a "risk society" (Beck 1992 ). In addition, perhaps because US government policies have been inadequate to combat global environmental crisis and make a smooth transition to a lower carbon energy future (e.g., Freidman 2008), firms and consumers are becoming more engaged with energy consumption issues. We will now turn our attention to the four consumption constraints on increasingly sustainable energy consumption that we evoked earlier.
Consumption Constraints: Policy/Regulation, Availability/Access, Pricing, Knowledge
Policy/Regulation
Policy and regulation constraints come in four main forms. The first is a lack of oversight in the sale of alternative power; the second is related to the interplay between regional and national policy; the third is national energy policy; and, the fourth is environmental policy issues.
Lack of Oversight in Sales of Alternative Power
Lack of trust in utility companies (Lindeman 1999) , coupled with a lack of third-party certification and labeling of branded alternatives, points to a constraint in which consumers lack tools to evaluate alternative energy products increasingly on offer (Roe, et al. 2006; Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2006) . The sale of power remains problematic in the marketplace because energy is regulated as a commodity; consumers are generally rewarded with lower prices for volume purchases, for example. Thus, electrical energy has not been sold as a product differentiated in terms of attributes that could address consumer concerns about global warming, the environment, or the well-being of producing communities. Until distinctions can be made in the marketplace for energy in terms of the resources used to generate the electricity (coal, natural gas, wind biomass, solar, etc.), clearer consumer understanding and improved management of energy consumption will remain problematic. Likewise, until differentiation in the marketplace for energy can be made in terms of the energy source's carbon footprint, the social costs of creating the energy, and use periodicity (peak vs. off-peak), clearer consumer understanding and improved management of energy consumption will also remain problematic. Changed state level regulatory policies that would decouple utility profits from volume sold and allow greater opportunities for utilities to offer differentiated products and services at different price points could induce more consumers to start thinking of energy as a differentiated product.
Regional/National Policy
The second group of policy issues relate to the structure and infrastructure of the market.
This includes discontinuity between local and national policies. As an example, most state regulations require power companies to purchase renewable energy from new independent providers (DSIRE n.d.). But, regulation also stipulates that the new entrants into the electrical grid are charged with upgrading and securing the grid to handle the additional power load (Kelly 2003) . Since the power grid is managed regionally and monopolistically, regional power regulators may impose stiff maintenance and upgrade penalties on would-be renewable power generators, thereby inhibiting new generation (EIA n.d.). Thus, the burden of maintenance and upgrades that would benefit the whole system are forced onto to specific producers.
Wind power producers are especially disadvantaged in this regard because wind generation is inherently intermittent, and thus considered by regional power operators to stress the grid. Intermittency can be mitigated by linking multiple wind plants, or exploiting multiple wind sources simultaneously, a prospect that is increased as generation capacity is added.
Unfortunately, regional policy allows the effects of each wind plant (intermittency) to be assessed individually rather than aggregated across the regional grid (Naughton 2008) , thereby underwriting discrimination of new wind plants and inhibiting addition of new capacity.
Furthermore, new transmission lines typically cannot be permitted until unmet demand can be documented, which means that lines dedicated to new alternative energy sources are difficult to justify as long as demand can be met from conventional sources (Walje 2008) . Until national or regional policies that favor renewable energy generation are put into place to regulate construction and upkeep of transmission lines, real innovations in putting renewable energy into the grid will be difficult.
National Issues/Government Oversight of Power Infrastructure
Much of the problem with energy infrastructure comes from lack of government oversight of national energy infrastructure despite the existence of a national regulatory authority, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This means that regional market forces, or lack thereof, have been the primary shapers of energy grid improvements, rather than a national long-term plan with enlightened regulation. With energy market deregulation, increasing volatility in energy prices, and the long payback to major infrastructure investments, regional and local power companies and authorities have eschewed adequate investments in the electrical grid to contend with peak load and new renewable generation sources. At the same time, to deal with the ever increasing demand for energy, power companies have given up a significant percentage of the power reserves that used to be an important part of the system (Ula 2008 ). This in turn, has provoked the rolling blackouts, i.e., supply shortfalls that have become a common summertime feature of the energy marketplace. As a result, consumers settle for a less reliable, less satisfying energy system, despite so-called mandatory reliability standards enshrined in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and other legislation (Lenard 2002) .
Not making policy decisions on a national level leads to market system inability to provide increasingly necessary services to firms and customers. The demand for energy services is both growing and becoming more differentiated from a consumer standpoint, while the delivery system remains outdated, commodity-oriented, and increasingly unreliable. Because of state renewable portfolio standards, wind power generation is growing at 40% per year, but is contending with a 10-year backlog on wind turbine orders (Naughton 2008) . Strong nationwide policy regarding renewable energy entering the grid could increase the opportunities for wind plants and other renewable sources to contribute to the market and open the field to more competition. This would help meet state renewable portfolio energy targets for production and 13 consumers' evolving demands.
Environmental Policy Issues
The Federal government has also failed to upgrade vehicle Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and power plant emissions standards aggressively, and act on carbon capture and storage, carbon ownership, carbon emissions regulation, and storage liability issues (we set aside discussion of the failure to enact Federal nuclear waste storage legislation). Power plant emissions standards and carbon capture and storage regulations affect the introduction of new cleaner coal technologies, for example and are especially salient given the preponderant role of coal in the nation's electric energy portfolio. Coal provides over half of the nation's electricity.
Nonetheless, some states have started legislating these issues. A few states are working to determine who owns the spaces under the ground and thus who should get paid for the use of those spaces for CO 2 capture. Related to this is deciding who owns the captured carbon; that is, who takes ultimate responsibility for the captured carbon, and who has the rights to the carbon should it become more valuable in the future. For example, Wyoming has determined that surface landowners also own the space under their land and this therefore falls under a different legal and regulatory regime than mineral rights. Meanwhile, Texas has decided that the state will take ultimate liability for the carbon itself. Even though capture and storage is a technologically viable way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in some regions and to increase the sustainability of energy consumption at the point of production, until these complex policy issues are dealt with companies or venture-capital investors may not seriously entertain investments in building carbon capture capabilities onto existing or future power plants (Coddington 2007; Siever 2008) .
Availability/Access
Constrained availability and access to renewable energy and energy efficient products contribute to the underdeveloped market for differentiated energy. This can be seen in the way energy companies respond to consumer demand and the so far tepid efforts put into stabilizing the grid (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 2007), in principle agent issues; and, also in limited product choices available to consumers.
Energy companies may be at a loss for how to respond to demand for more renewable power, since deficiencies in the transmission infrastructure, make renewable power unavailable in most parts of the country (Stade 2008 (Wald 2008) . In sum, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that it needs about 2100 miles of new line to achieve the target of serving 20% of the nation's energy with renewables. This would cost about $60 billion over a ten-year period (Wald 2008) .
Taking into account the permitting and construction lag time, it is hard to see how, looking forward, energy supply, above all renewable energy supplies, can meet projected demand. This situation reduces consumer access to green power and stunts market development for more sustainable energy consumption.
In spite of the obstacles, about 600 utilities in 34 states do offer green power options whereby consumers may purchase "wind generated" power such as Austin Energy's GreenChoice® or Rocky Mountain Power's BlueSky™ Renewable Energy (Bird, Wüstenhagen and Aabakken 2002; Swezey and Bird 2000) . Consumers can also purchase "green" power using renewable energy certificates (RECs). However, in the US what consumers generally buy are "offsets." That is, the power company actually may be selling wind generated power as part of its overall power generation, reselling wind power from some other generator or paying another company to buy wind elsewhere to offset its own fossil fuel power. It is not evident that energy companies must actually change their overall environmental behaviors. There are no guarantees that the environmental footprint of what comes out of the electrical outlet in the consumers' home or business is truly green. Often, consumers are not actually purchasing green power, but supporting renewable energy development. Thus, power companies offer more sustainable power options, but consumers may not take advantage of them in part due to the lack of transparency about what happens to their investments.
When the involvement of intermediaries in the purchase of energy technologies limits the ultimate consumers' role in decision making, this is labeled the "principal-agent problem." It is widespread in the US energy market. Due to principle agent issues, restrictions on access to more sustainable energy consumption are built into building construction and management systems. For example, investment costs for more sustainable heating, ventilation and airconditioning systems that can dramatically reduce operating costs are typically higher than ruleof-thumb norms dictate, and as a result more sustainable systems on a life cycle costing basis are under-installed. In other words, users might prefer buildings and appliances that are cheaper and more efficient to use, but because of higher up-front costs, these efficiencies are usually not purchased. Building designers can be second-guessed if investment costs exceed norm (Brown 2001 (Brown , 1199 .
A related example of principle agent problems can be found in the landlord-tenant relationship in building leases. If tenants pay energy bills, landlords have no incentives to invest in more energy efficient equipment. Conversely, if landlords pay for energy costs, tenants have no incentive to use energy efficiently. Since 90% of households in multifamily buildings are renters, and there are tens of thousands of multifamily buildings in the US, the disincentive to more sustainable energy consumption is particularly problematic (Brown 2001 (Brown , 1200 .
Incomplete markets for energy efficiency are another serious obstacle to access to more sustainable energy consumption across a range of product/service categories. In part, this is because the energy efficiency of a product or service is typically bundled with a host of other services provided (style, appearance, varied functionalities), and often this attribute is not broken out for consumers. Moreover, rarely is it the case that higher energy efficiencies are treated as separate product/service options and priced differentially. Thus, in general, consumers are unable to purchase a given brand/model of car, computer, or major appliance that is priced differentially on the basis of energy inputs, greenhouse gas emissions in production, energy efficiency in operation, or energy costs in disposal, and so on (Brown 2001 (Brown , 1202 .
In some markets access to more energy efficient products is increasing. The EPA/DOE Energy Star™ program has engaged over 2000 manufacturers and 1000 retailers to use Energy Star™ labels to differentiate more than 40,000 individual product models in terms of energy performance. Evidence of the existence of demand for energy efficiency may be seen in the growth of units purchased from just over 500,000 in 2000 to more than 2.5 billion in 2007 (EPA 2008a). However, because participants are not mandated to achieve particular energy saving targets, and because there is some question about the conditions under which appliances are tested for compliance with EnergyStar™ criteria, customers still face major barriers to purchasing higher efficiency products.
Pricing
Pricing constrains consumer choices in energy use and products in several ways. First, is the cost to generating more sustainable power at a residential level; second, is the cost of purchasing "green power" and how that is explained to consumers; lastly, is the difficult choices consumers make in purchasing new products.
The cost to consumers of generating their own power through local windmills or solar panels remains prohibitive, and in most cases pushes these options into the luxury product category. A residential wind turbine can cost between $6,000 and $22,000 (American Wind Energy Association 2008), and a 1-kilowatt system solar panel system can cost $8,000-12,000 (SolarBuzz 2008). Some tax credits and assistance are available to cover part of the purchase cost, but the price of these residential systems is a consumption constraint for users who might otherwise engage in a small-scale energy production. Zoning and covenant restrictions might well add to the potential costs of installing alternative local energy generation equipment.
Justifying the pricing of green energy is difficult because consumers can detect no difference in electricity at the point of consumption with regards to origin, source, or level of pollution generated (Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2006) . This makes it remarkable that several market segments state they are willing to pay a small amount more for decreased air emissions, and certain sub-segments of these individuals are willing to pay even larger amounts for decreased air emissions coupled with increased reliance on renewable energy sources (Roe et al. 2001; Valocchi, et al. 2007; Wüstenhagen and Bilharz 2006) . While 50% to 95% of Americans say they are willing to pay more for power derived from renewable sources, market simulations or field studies, demonstrate that a far smaller percentage -10% to 20% -do so. Actual marketing efforts to 2001 achieve even lower penetration levels: among the 40 million American households with access to green power through either regulated or restructured markets, roughly 350,000 households, or approximately1%, chose to buy green power (Wiser, et al. 2001 ).
Nevertheless, from 2003 through 2007, renewable energy consumption's average annual growth rate was 3 percent, compared with just 1 percent for total energy consumption. Biofuels and wind were largely responsible for the increase, with 5-year average annual growth rates of 25 and 29%, respectively (EIA 2008) . Perhaps this modest growth reflects consumer desires to pay the "full cost" for energy consumption, costs that would take into account environmental and social costs (Shapiro 1978 ), but this is not known.
Variable pricing along with the use of smart meters is another way that consumers encounter pricing issues. Because of the strain on the grid and predictions for increased energy use in the future, power companies are piloting programs that are designed to entice consumers to use less electricity during peak times (Baltimore Gas and Electric Company n.d). Some of these programs give customers smart meters, which monitor their electricity use in real time, and give them reduced price rates for energy used at off-peak times. For example, the cost of electricity may jump from about 4 cents a kilowatt-hour during off peak times to 24 cents a kilowatt-hour during regular peak times, and $1.50 a kilowatt hour during "critical peak" times.
In one program, users were sent an email 30 minutes before critical peak times, alerting them to a looming price increase, and inviting them to reduce use (Smith 2008 Investment in Smart Metering technology becomes a public policy issue that will need resolution, in many cases in state Public Service Commission (PSC) venues. Many PSCs will require that utilities provide them with a comprehensive description of the costs and benefits they can expect to attribute to a Smart Metering investment. Clearly there are several prototypes and business cases that provide examples of how smart metering can be accomplished. How readily or quickly PSCs will act, and how to characterize and quantify the societal benefits of smart metering are unknown.
In the realm of product choice, a lack of understanding about the energy that products use may hinder consumers from making more sustainable long-term energy consumption choices.
Consumers tend to focus on the cost of investing in a new product rather than the cost of using that product throughout its lifecycle (Brown 2001 ). The Energy Star™ label is one information program that has increased consumer awareness of the benefit of paying an initially higher cost 20 for a more efficient product. In 2007, Energy Star™ products prevented an additional 40 million tons of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and saved consumers over $16 billion on electricity bills (EPA 2007). However, inexpensive technologies such as automated controls on appliances that allow consumers or the appliances themselves to adjust power use to changing grid conditions, have yet to be broadly extended (EPA 2007; Northwest National Laboratory 2007) .
Knowledge
Marketing systems tend to focus on the exchange of goods and services for the benefit of at least the two exchanging parties. Information is one element of marketing systems that is typically asymmetrical and managed through some intermediary structure, i.e. advertising agencies, spokespersons, or governments (Layton 2007). In the case of energy use, the product or service being purchased is understood by the value of what it does (e.g. power a refrigerator, turn lights on), not what it is (e.g., electrons channeled into a grid). Thus, from a consumer perspective, information regarding energy is confusing from the beginning, because energy sources and management are not well understood. Downstream efforts to provide consumers information on the energy costs of products have met with confusion (Green and Capell 2008, 54) . For consumers who want to know details about the origins of their energy, a broader understanding of the product they are purchasing may be necessary. To understand the extremely complex electrical system, one must look at various stages of the creation of electricity from the raw materials to the electrons in the grid, as well as the infrastructure and stakeholders involved in creating, distributing, and monitoring energy use once electricity is in the grid. We have raised these aspects of the energy market above; we limit our discussion here to home and office energy use.
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Consumers' lack of understanding of issues related to energy does not stop at "green power" offerings from local power companies. In addition to the upstream systems issues identified above, more subtle issues that most consumers are not aware of can be identified, such as the amount of energy that different products use, or energy lost through "leaks," when appliances and electronics are in standby mode or ostensibly turned off. For example, few consumers realize that new electronic gear like gaming stations and plasma TVs are huge energy hogs, adding many dollars a year to household energy bills (Choice 2008). Furthermore, leaking electricity accounts for approximately five percent of total household energy use and the leakage is growing as homes add appliances (Meier et al. 1998 ).
Because electricity bills are aggregated across uses and paid on a monthly basis, it is difficult for consumers to evaluate and revise their decision making with regards to the cost effects to their households of appliance use or leaking electricity. On a monthly basis, the marginal costs are minimal; however if the principles of mental accounting could be applied to reframing energy bills so that consumers could see the detailed costs of appliance use and leakage as a yearly dollar amount, perceptions and behavior might change (Gourville 1998; Heath and Soil 1996) . Smart circuitry, which could stop energy leaks, could be installed in many consumer products. If all appliances and electronics in the US were replaced or retrofitted with units designed to leak no more than 1-watt, aggregate energy loss due to leakage could fall by as much as 70%, leading to a savings of over $2 billion each year (Meier et al. 1998) . Because consumers lack knowledge and because there is little regulatory oversight over leakage issues, appliance producers are not induced to incur the relatively minimal cost of introducing smart circuitry into their products.
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The US EPA/DOE Energy Star™ program is an example of a public policy driven approach to increasing awareness and knowledge of energy consumption and/or spur to more sustainable energy consumption. A recent study showed that substantial portions of U.S. households recognize, understand, and are influenced by the Energy Star™ label. The proportion of households that exhibit a high understanding of the program is significant (65 percent). More than a third of households the EPA surveyed had purchased an Energy Star™ labeled appliance in the 12 months prior to the survey, and of these households, three fourths cited the Energy Star™ label as playing a role in their purchase decisions. The study showed that publicity may increase consumer recognition and understanding. It also showed the influence of the label on purchase decisions (EPA 2008b).
The previous sections of this essay identified factors that constrain customers' ability to engage in sustainable energy consumption. We outlined issues related to policy, access, pricing, and consumer knowledge. We conclude with some thoughts on the relationship between the energy market and commons issues, and promising areas for future research.
Thoughts on the Market System and the Energy Commons
The market system constraints to more sustainable energy consumption briefly identified above--regulation, access, pricing, and knowledge--and others we are unable to discuss due to space constraints, contribute to a larger market systems challenge. This is an example of the tragedy of the global ecological commons (Shultz and Holbrook 1999) . The commons dilemma occurs whenever there is a conflict over finite resources between individual interests and the common good resulting in a dramatic drawdown in that resource and eventually a collapse of the 23 resource and the socio-economic system it supported. A consequence of current energy consumption patterns is the dramatic and accelerating increase in atmospheric C0 2, and the resultant global warming and climate change with negative consequences for the whole biosphere (IPCC 2007) . Regulation is the most commonly proposed solution to commons dilemmas such as this, but often regulation is ineffective or comes too late as in the case of the collapse of the Grand Banks fisheries (Greenpeace International 2005) . The Grand Banks, off the coast of Newfoundland, were some of the richest fishing grounds in the world, and fed people from Europe to South America for over 500 years. Overfishing for many years, made more severe by modern technology introduced in the 1950s is credited for a disastrous decline in fish populations and species. The fisheries were closed in 1992, and 40,0000 people lost their jobs. Fish populations have been slow to recover, and many question whether they will ever recover at all (Rose 2008) . The three-legged stool approach to sustainability highlights the interdependence of ecological, economic and societal impacts of choices and actions for good or ill. This approach helps foster an ecosystems perspective in which market system elements are embedded. It provides an approach to solving commons dilemmas that could complement the moral approach others have proposed (Shultz and Holbrook 1999) to resolving the ecological commons problem of global warming, pollution, and energy shortfalls to little avail. In the sections above, we suggested that improvements in the energy market system are necessary, if insufficient, solutions to the commons issues provoked by unsustainable energy consumption.
Researchable Issues
One way to approach research opportunities for marketing scholars in sustainable energy consumption is to embed these in a model of market system stakeholders in the global energy commons. In this framework, we can start with the household and firm level, move on to community, society, and the broader ecosystem levels, and touch on knowledge, access, pricing, and policy issues as appropriate at each level.
Household/Firm
Stimulating demand for energy efficient appliances among households and firms, and stimulating consumer interest in household/firm energy management such that customers demand such technologies from appliance makers and utilities are steps toward more sustainable energy consumption. With that in mind, it may be useful to experiment with marketing stimuli that position energy savings and management in terms of cultural values, such as freedom, frugality, independence, stewardship, and ingenuity, or in terms of orientations toward technology in general (Kozinets 2008; Pillar 1993) . Recent revisionist thinking in diffusion theory invites testing network versus opinion leadership effects in the domain of sustainable energy consumption in which effective innovations in energy retailing have proven elusive (Watts and Dodds 2007) . In a complementary vein, research on innovative products suggests that any behavior change required of consumers may be perceived as a "loss," and hence the offsetting "gains" offered by the product must be relatively large. Research might address how large such gains in performance or savings must be to offset losses and what kind of gains they must be as well (Gourville 2006) .
Full-cost energy pricing has been suggested as a way to address the ecological and social costs of energy production and use. How can the cost of ecological services be inserted into the 25 price of utilities and appliances, and how might individuals respond to full cost pricing? It might seem that the higher price of energy alternatives (wind credits or energy efficient appliances) creates a negative perception in the minds of consumers leading them to reject full cost pricing.
How might research on framing effects, task compatibility, loss aversion, schema incongruity and the like, be harnessed to understand better the poor penetration of sustainable electricity choices and ways of increasing their attractiveness (Dhar and Sherman 1996; Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989) ? For example, in one recent study, framing environmental costs either as an earmarked tax or as an offset, differentially affected the preferences of Democrats and Republicans (Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber n.d.) . In the future, it would be interesting to vary the price stimuli as well as the demographic sample criteria, using IBM's segments, or residence in an energy producing or consuming region, for instance.
Because there is so much missing information in the choices consumers make regarding energy consumption, this area holds great potential for understanding dynamic processes and how consumers react to missing information (Venkatraman, Durairaj and Peracchio 2006) on the individual and family identity issues associated with various energy segments such as those identified in the IBM study (Epp and Price 2008; Valocchi et al. 2007) ; possible links between energy savings, sacrifice, and frugality (Miller 1998) ; and, indeed on the relationship between lay theories of the relationship between energy and consumption (Arnould and Thompson 2005) .
Experience in other countries suggests that people must trust and accept political leadership if meaningful new energy policies are to be accepted (Wüstenhagen 2007 (Wüstenhagen , 2689 . We might explore how consumers feel about policymakers, and how policy leadership should be framed to make it more acceptable to various skeptical constituents. In other words, does it make a difference if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission or the Federal Trade Commission weighs in on energy choices given how consumers may react to words like "nuclear," "safety" or "Federal" in the titles of these organizations? Further, research might explore how the past behavior of energy companies especially as mediated through various memory effects (e.g., Three Mile Island), affects skeptical constituents' willingness to consider new energy policy, demand, or adopt new technologies.
Community/Society
Creating a smarter, more stable and more sustainable energy grid should be a priority for the country. One key challenge to more sustainable energy consumption is to bridge gaps between national and local policies that mirror gaps in interests between different stakeholder communities. Research may explore what kinds of marketing energy companies could engage in to create a more favorable environment for energy grid investments. Another general question is what information about the nature of demand should be communicated to whom, in order to influence policy that would reinforce and stabilize the energy grid.
We could also look into how national or state objectives can be translated into locally acceptable policies. For example, one problematic issue is siting decisions for new decentralized production and transmission facilities that are more sustainable (e.g., carbon sequestered coal burning plants) or based on renewable energy sources (e.g., solar collector fields; wind plants). A better understanding of stakeholders' conflicts may derive from studies of escalation of commitment that deal with sub-optimal decision making under hardened attitudes (Piller 1993; Ross and Staw 1993; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky Gillian Ku 2008; Whyte, 1993; Whyte and Fassina 2007; Wong, Kwong and Ng 2008) . Approaches to solutions may be explored through 28 research explicating the structure of attitudes towards technology and nature (Kozinets 2008; Pillar 1993) , willingness-to-accept frameworks, and from research that looks into the conditions for customer community attraction, engagement, and co-production of value (Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006; Maryuma, Nishikido and Iida 2007; Mathwick, Wiertz and De Ruyter 2007; McAlexander, Schouten and Koenig 2005) .
Another related challenge is how entrenched institutional pressures against optimal renewable energy technologies may be overcome. Lessons from case studies of successful natural resource management initiatives (Arnould 1990 ); grass-roots investment in community wind power in Japan and Denmark (Kolbert 2008; Maruyama, Nishikido and Iida 2007) and other siting controversies (Dorshimer 1996) Accountability is another major issue for changes and lack of changes along the energy value chain. One significant problem is how market intermediaries/principle agents (such as architects, installers) influence the market acceptance of sustainable energy technologies and management practices. A researchable question related to the principle agent issue is looking into what kinds of policies could induce appliance manufacturers to begin installing smart electric monitoring and consumption technologies in the appliances they produce. A major value chain issue raised here is how the carbon footprint of an energy product should be measured.
What is the fair way to apportion out fiduciary and other legal responsibility; who in the value 29 chain should take responsibility for what percentage of the emissions; who should be punished for violations; who should oversee production and transmission projects; and against whom should punitive sanctions for intentional or unintentional violations of standards be addressed (Green and Capell 2008) ?
Ecosystems/Energy Commons
The ecosystem level is the widest vantage point that we use to look at the energy commons. Researchable issues at this level engage questions about the environmental effects of producing, managing, and consuming energy. A key issue at the ecosystems level is how we can apply techniques used to recover common property resources like fisheries, national parks, or marine reserves to solve the energy commons problem at the local and national level. In general, joint commitments among many stakeholders are needed to create long-term solutions to the commons dilemma. How can such joint commitments to confront the energy commons dilemma be produced (Arnould 1990; Scammon and Mason 2007) ? Research suggests that values can be mobilized to induce joint commitments to investments in energy infrastructure (Dorshimer 1996; Kolbert 2008; Groothuis, Groothuis and Whitehead 2008) . However, research could also investigate the values that are most effectively mobilized to induce joint commitments.
Conclusion
The ultimate question is whether applied policy research can help lead toward resolution of energy commons dilemmas and improvements in policy, access, pricing, and informed customer choice within an evolving market system. Prior research on improving natural resource 30 management has identified several keys to successful innovation. Among these are some measure of transparency in systems governance; a modicum of support for policies that induce behavioral changes; delivery of short, medium and long term benefits to key stakeholders; sustained investment over a 5-10 year time line; improvements in market structure and efficiency; and, engagement of boundary spanning actors with legitimacy among different stakeholder groups (Arnould 1990; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006) . Linking research to this type of framework for action may indicate a way forward that could provide relief from sustainable energy consumption constraints.
To the extent that there is consumer debate about electrical energy consumption, it has tended to fall into predictable positions embedded in contradictory normative frameworks. On one side is a framework espousing or endorsing a resource intensive way of life based on ideas like rugged individualism (a don't-tread-on-me worldview); personal (wasteful) choice as an inalienable American right; an equation of material affluence with spiritual grace; an aversion to elitism and a laissez faire aversion to authority; an assumption that American nature is a boundless resource; and a conception of American nature as the wellspring of the American national character. On the other side is a social reforming normative framework espousing an anti-consumerist ethic based on ideas like, Protestant asceticism; the necessity of moral restraints on market choices; the view that community interests should trump individual self-interest; the notion that collective sacrifice leads to national solidarity; an equation of material affluence with moral transgression and "affluenza;" and a conception of American nature as a fragile system that requires careful stewardship (Arnould, Price and Tierney 1998; DeGraaf, et al. 2001; Luedicke, Giesler and Thompson, n.d.; Scott 2006) . Our systems perspective moves the argument away from such intractable moral and ethical debates and toward market structures, incentives, and regulations. While moral concerns play a role in sustainable energy policy, alone they cannot drive solutions.
